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With the ability to leak conﬁdential information in a secret manner, covert channels pose a signiﬁcant threat to the
conﬁdentiality of a system. Due to this threat, the identiﬁcation of covert channel existence has become an important
part of the evaluation of secure systems. In this paper, we present a state-of-the-art survey discussing the conditions for
covert channel existence found in the literature and we point to their inadequacy. We also examine how conditions for
covert channel existence are handled by information theory. We propose a set of necessary and veriﬁable conditions for
covert channel existence in systems of communicating agents. We aim to provide an improved understanding of covert
channel communication and to build a foundation for developing eﬀective and eﬃcient mechanisms for mitigating covert
channels in systems of communicating agents at the early stages of software development.
c© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
The concept of covert channels is commonly attributed to the work of Lampson [1]. A covert channel
refers to any communication channel that allows a process or agent to transfer information in a manner that
violates the system’s security policy [2]. Traditionally, covert channels have been classiﬁed as either storage
channels or as timing channels, even though it has been suggested that there is no fundamental distinction
between them [3].
The existence of covert channels poses a threat to system security for a number of reasons. Firstly,
covert channels present a conﬁdentiality concern since they provide a means for data exﬁltration, allowing
for sensitive information to be leaked secretly to agents for which the information was not intended. For
this reason, covert channels yield an avenue for insider threats. An insider threat is anyone who has special
access to, or knowledge of, conﬁdential information with the intent to cause harm or danger [4]. Insider
threats are often cited as the most serious security problem in many studies since many organisations often
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overlook them [5]. The existence of covert channels and insider threats also introduces economical concerns
since it allows for information to be transmitted using an existing system without legitimacy of the usage of
the service provided. This case is often exempliﬁed when a system is infected by a Trojan Horse. Reported
losses due to insider threats have been estimated annually to be in the millions of dollars [4]. Furthermore,
since covert channels are commonly based on obscure uses of system resources and functionalities, they
ultimately reduce system performance, leading to reductions in productivity. The existence of such concerns,
along with a variety of others, has led the United States Department of Defense and the National Computer
Security Center to include covert channel analysis as part of the evaluation criteria for the classiﬁcation of
secure systems outlined in [2] and [6], respectively.
Covert channels are poorly understood [7]. In the current literature, conditions for covert channel exis-
tence vary in terminology and in the way they are articulated. Many existing conditions for covert channel
existence are inconsistent, which makes formal techniques for the veriﬁcation of covert channel existence
in systems of communicating agents a diﬃcult task. The objective of this paper is to present a set of in-
formal conditions which are necessary for the existence of covert communication channels in systems of
communicating agents. We can imagine a system of communicating agents, where each agent has a data
store with its own set of conﬁdential information. In this case, we can suppose that a security policy might
forbid the communication of the conﬁdential information of each agent to any other agent. This situation
can be illustrated in cloud computing, where there may be a number of cloud agents. Each agent can have
a set of conﬁdential information that should not be leaked to any other agent. Additionally, each agent can
have information which is permitted to be communicated to the other agents in the system.
We aim to consolidate the varying conditions existent in the literature in order to develop a set of nec-
essary conditions for covert channel existence. We also aim to point to the inadequacy of the existing
conditions in the literature. We think that a new set of necessary covert channel existence conditions would
help to improve the current understanding of covert channels. It would also serve as a basis for developing
eﬀective and eﬃcient mechanisms for mitigating covert channels in systems of communicating agents.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the related work found in
the literature and discusses existing sets of covert channel existence conditions. Section 3 looks at how
conditions for covert channel existence are handled by information theory. Section 4 outlines the proposed
set of necessary conditions for covert channel existence in systems of communicating agents and discusses
their importance, while comparing them to existing conditions. Section 5 gives an example to demonstrate
the applicability of the proposed set of necessary conditions for verifying the existence of a covert channel
in a system of communicating agents. Section 6 draws conclusions and details future work.
2. Conditions for Covert Channel Existence as Found in the Literature
Among the ﬁrst to provide existence conditions for covert channels was Kemmerer when he presented
the Shared Resource Matrix Methodology [8]. Kemmerer gave two separate sets of conditions distinguish-
ing between storage channels and timing channels. These conditions were given as a means of analysing a
constructed shared resource matrix to identify possible covert channels. Following the work of Kemmerer,
many others presented similar sets of conditions for the existence of covert channels in computer systems.
For instance, in [9], we ﬁnd a reﬁnement of the conditions presented in [8], and in [10], the consideration
of the security levels of the sender and the receiver were included. Also, in [11], we ﬁnd a condensed set of
conditions which must be satisﬁed for covert channel existence. In this section, we discuss the large body of
existing work which expresses the conditions for covert channel existence. We discuss the inconsistencies
among the varying conditions and we call attention to the inadequacy of the existing conditions. We con-
jecture that a consolidation and reﬁnement of some of these existing conditions will allow us to articulate
a new set of necessary conditions for covert channel existence in systems of communicating agents. The
proposed set of necessary conditions is detailed in Section 4.
A condition existing in many sets of covert channel existence conditions found in the literature is related
to the existence of shared resources. For both storage and timing channels, the condition states, “The sending
and receiving processes must have access to the same attribute of a shared resource” [8]. Similar conditions
are given in [9, 10, 11]. In [9], the condition is alternatively phrased in terms of the existence of a global
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variable rather than the existence of a shared resource. In the case of two agents, this condition is required.
However, it is not required in the general case. Take, for instance, a sending agent S and a receiving agent R.
It is possible that the sending agent and receiving agent can communicate through a set of proxies, {P1, P2}
for example. In this case, S can communicate with P1, which may react to the communication from S by
deterministically conveying a message to P2, which in turn will deterministically write to a memory location
that R can read. Then, S and R do not share any resources but can still communicate, provided that S
knows the deterministic mechanism of P1 and P2. The knowledge of such mechanisms is not uncommon
if P1 and P2 are servers with deterministic behaviours. It is not necessary that S knows which memory
location P2 writes to, simply that it does and that R can read the memory. This is an example of indirect
communication between S and R. We can imagine that this sort of indirect communication exists between
any arbitrary number of proxies.
Another condition which can be found in many existing sets of conditions for covert channel existence is
the ability for a sending agent to alter a shared resource in such a way that the receiving agent can detect or
observe the alteration. Often this condition is broken into two conditions detailing the existence of a sending
mechanism for the sending agent and the existence of a receiving mechanism for the receiving agent. For
storage channels, “There must be some means by which the sending process can force the shared attribute to
change” and “There must be some means by which the receiving process can detect the attribute change” [8].
Again, in [9], similar conditions are given in terms of global variables rather than shared resources. In [12],
we ﬁnd a condition which attempts to express the same spirit as those given in [8]. The condition states,
“There must be an eﬀective procedure for exploiting a security ﬂaw to form a channel for transmitting a
useful quantity of information from the sending process to the receiving process in a timely manner.” We
ﬁnd that it is not necessary that a security ﬂaw be exploited in order to form a communication channel.
Covert channels are designed in such a way that they intentionally bypass the security policy of the system.
Therefore, the formation of a communication channel can be done by simply modifying the behaviour of
agents so that they are able to use the system in unintended ways. Furthermore, this condition carries a
signiﬁcant amount of ambiguity. For instance, it is not clear what is meant by “an eﬀective procedure for
exploiting a security ﬂaw” or by the ability to transmit “a useful quantity of information in a timely manner.”
With such ambiguity, we cannot expect to adequately determine whether such a condition is satisﬁed.
In [10], we ﬁnd conditions regarding the abilities of the sending agent and the receiving agent similar to
those found in [8]. However, the conditions in [10] consider the security levels of the sender and the receiver.
The conditions state that “There is a method by which the sender subject with a higher security level can
modify the shared attribute of object” and “There is a method by which the receiver subject with a lower
security level can detect this change.” The inclusion of security levels introduces an implicit assumption
that there exists a security policy which forbids all communication from subjects at higher security levels to
subjects at lower security levels. However, this is too restrictive since the security policy may not always
enforce such restrictions. Moreover, there is no mention of the security level of the object in question. If
we consider a security policy articulated according to the Bell-LaPadula model, which prohibits low-level
subjects to read high-level objects and high-level subjects to write into low-level objects, then the only way
the sender will be able to write to the object is if the level of the object is at the same level or at a higher
level than the sender subject. Then, if the level of the object is at the same level or at a higher level than the
sender subject, the receiver subject will be forbidden from reading the object. Therefore, there is no way that
these conditions can be satisﬁed simultaneously as the sender and receiver need to be at the same security
level in order to write and read the object, respectively. Additionally, even if the sender and receiver are at
the same security level, since there is no consideration of what is being communicated by the sender and
receiver, there can still be a violation of the security policy if the sender is leaking conﬁdential information.
We do not want to close communication channels which are not in violation of the system security policy.
Therefore, we need to capture what is being communicated by the agents in the system and we ought to
avoid over-restricting the behaviour of the agents in the system.
In [8], a distinction is made between storage and timing channels. This distinction translates to the sets
of existence conditions. The ability for a sending agent to alter a shared resource in such a way that the
receiving agent can detect or observe the alteration is recast in terms of clocks and response times. For a
timing channel to exist, “The sending and receiving processes must have access to a time reference such as
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a real-time clock” and “The sender must be capable of modulating the receiver’s response time for detecting
a change in the shared attribute” [8]. An important observation about the conditions for the existence of a
timing channel is that they imply that either the sending agent or the receiving agent has the ability to change
the value of the shared attribute in order to implement the timing channel. Also, we ﬁnd that there is no need
to have separate conditions for covert storage channels and covert timing channels. It is well known that any
time two agents share a processor, there exists a shared resource among the processes, namely, a common
clock or time reference. Actually, covert timing channels require two clocks: a reference clock (usually a
system clock) to measure the absolute time and another clock to be modulated by the sending agent and
observed by the receiving agent [13]. Therefore, we can simply view a common clock as a shared attribute
of the shared processor and the conditions for storage channels and timing channels can be consolidated into
one set of conditions. This extends from the suggestion that there is no fundamental distinction between
storage and timing channels [3].
Another condition found in the literature is related to the correct synchronisation and sequencing of
events so that communication between the sending and receiving agents can take place. According to [9],
“The sender and the receiver must be able to synchronise their operations so that information ﬂow can take
place.” A similar articulation of this condition, ensuring the correct order of communication events between
the sending agent and the receiving agent, can be found in [10]. Also, in [8], for both timing and storage
channels, the condition states, “There must be some mechanism for initiating the communication between
the sending and receiving processes and for sequencing the events correctly. This mechanism could be
another channel with a smaller bandwidth.” One of the inherent issues with the above condition, is that
one needs to devise a scenario that satisﬁes the condition. This requires insight and imagination into the
system being analysed which may not be a trivial exercise. We would like to have a set of conditions
that do not require such heuristics in order to verify their satisfaction for a given protocol. We can see
that the collective behaviour of the agents in a system presents a pattern of communication that reﬂects
the possibility of sequencing events. This pattern of communication is a study of the behaviour of the
agents in the system and not a study of the available resources. We need to determine whether a chain of
communication allowing for information to ﬂow from a sending agent to a receiving agent exists in the
system. If we model the behaviour of the agents in the system in some speciﬁcation language, a process
algebra for example, we can examine the resulting traces for such patterns of communication which entail
the correct sequencing and synchronisation of events. This examination of the traces for the given pattern
of communication is veriﬁable by techniques such as model checking or algebraic manipulation.
In [9, 14, 15], we ﬁnd that the conditions found in [8] have been rephrased and condensed by establishing
conditions pertaining to the potential for communication. According to [9], “The sender and receiver of the
covert channel have the potential to communicate in the system.” In conjunction with the other conditions
presented in [9, 14, 15], we ﬁnd that the above condition captures the idea that there must be a sending agent
acting as the source of information and a receiving agent acting as the sink, such that if information can
ﬂow from the source to the sink, then there is a potential for communication. However, this is not entirely
clear from the condition presented as it is. For instance, it is not clear what exactly is meant by “potential to
communicate.” We are required to infer the existence of an information ﬂow from the sender to the receiver.
In developing a necessary set of existence conditions for covert channels in systems of communicating
agents, we wish to eliminate the need for such inferences.
In [9] and [12], we ﬁnd a diﬀerent condition for covert channel existence related to the security policy
employed by the system. Particularly, “The sender must be forbidden to communicate with the receiver
under the system’s security policy” [12]. It can be seen that this condition is not necessary, since, when
taken to the extreme case, the condition would force us to have a closed system where no agent is permitted
to communicate with any other agent. This kind of condition is too restrictive as it does not allow for
communication among agents. We do not wish to forbid the communication among agents, but rather
restrict the information that can be communicated. This requires the study of the knowledge of each agent
in order to determine whether any conﬁdential information has been or can be communicated.
In [12], we also ﬁnd a summary of the conditions for the existence innocuous covert channels. A
covert channel is considered innocuous if any of the following conditions are satisﬁed: (1) The sender
and receiver are the same subject; (2) The sender is allowed to communicate directly with the receiver
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under the system’s security policy; (3) There is no eﬀective way to utilise the signalling mechanism. These
conditions were also implicitly mentioned in [8]. The inclusion of these conditions into the set of conditions
for covert channel existence will eliminate the need to verify two separate sets of conditions, namely, those
which verify whether a covert channel exists and those which eliminate innocuous channels from the list
of existing covert channels. Consider the second condition given above. If the sending agent is allowed to
communicate directly with the receiving agent, this does not necessarily mean that the communication is
innocuous, since the information being communicated might be conﬁdential information, i.e., the sending
agent may be leaking conﬁdential information directly to the receiving agent. This condition does not
capture this scenario.
After examining the conditions for covert channel existence found in the literature, we ﬁnd that there is a
lack of consistent terminology among existing sets of conditions. We also ﬁnd that many existing conditions
are inadequate at capturing the conditions which are necessary for covert channels to exist. Because of the
inadequacy of the existing sets of conditions for covert channel existence, there is a need for a new set of
necessary conditions for covert channel existence in systems of communicating agents.
3. Information Theoretical Handling of Conditions for Covert Channel Existence
In the literature, we ﬁnd that attempts to characterise covert channel existence in computer systems
have been developed on the foundations of information theory. Information theory, which dates back to
Shannon [16], involves the quantiﬁcation of information and deals with ﬁnding the fundamental limits on
reliably storing and communicating data. In this section, we examine how existing information theoretic
approaches impose conditions for covert channel existence in computer systems. In particular, information
theoretic approaches have been used to establish existence conditions for covert communication channels
based on the threat imposed by such channels. The motivation is to quantitatively measure the threat of a
covert channel to determine whether it can be considered innocuous.
According to [17], channel capacity estimation is an important part of covert channel analysis since it
is often used as a measure of the threat posed by a covert channel. Capacity estimation allows an analyst
to determine whether a given covert channel is an eﬀective means for communicating information. In [2],
we ﬁnd that covert channels with capacities greater than 100 bits per second are considered unacceptable
and therefore indicate a real threat to system security. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that covert channels with
capacities lower than 1 bit per second are considered acceptable, meaning that such channels are considered
to be eﬀectively innocuous. Therefore, it can be seen that a condition for covert channel existence is estab-
lished based on the capacity of the channel in question. If the channel capacity is greater than a prescribed
threshold, then a covert channel exists and it is considered to be a threat to system security. Conversely, if
the channel capacity is lower than the prescribed threshold, then it is considered that a covert channel does
not exist since it cannot be eﬀectively used to communicate information.
Although capacity estimation provides a quantitative measure for determining whether covert channels
posing a threat to system security exist, it has been argued, that the notion of channel capacity is an insuﬃ-
cient stand-alone measure of the threat introduced by the existence of covert channels [17]. As motivation
for this argument, an example of a zero capacity channel is given in [17], on which any message can be
sent, thus illustrating that knowing that the capacity is zero does ensure that we are in a secure situation.
This observation has led to the introduction of the small message criterion. In the same way that capacity
estimation provides a quantitative measure for the threat posed by a covert channel, where an analyst can
determine if a covert channel is considered to be innocuous or a threat, the small message criterion has
a similar mission. Roughly speaking, by taking into account the length of the message being sent on the
channel, the ﬁdelity of the message, and the time frame over which the message is sent, the small message
criterion dictates what will be tolerated in terms of a covert channel leaking a message of length n bits in
time τ with ﬁdelity of transmission ρ%.
These tolerances, however, can still result in a greater threat than what is calculated using information
theoretic techniques, particularly when low capacity channels, which are considered innocuous, are used as
the mechanism for initiating and correctly sequencing the communication between the sending agent and the
receiving agent. This aligns with the fourth existence condition of both storage and timing channels in [8].
463 Jason Jaskolka et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  10 ( 2012 )  458 – 465 
The use of these low capacity channels aids in the establishment of higher capacity covert channels. For
instance, as discussed in [7], it is possible to establish a covert communication scheme involving the use of
multiple low capacity channels such that their combination results in a much higher capacity communication
channel which can be used to leak conﬁdential information. In order to mitigate this threat, it should be
noted that it is not uncommon for the capacity threshold to be zero, meaning that any covert channel with a
non-zero capacity is considered to be a threat [17].
4. Articulation of a Set of Necessary Conditions for Covert Channel Existence
Based on our discussion in Section 2 and Section 3, we establish our proposed set of necessary conditions
for covert channel existence. In a system of communicating agents, if there exists a covert channel, then the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. Constraint on Communication: If there exists conﬁdential information in the data store of an agent, then
there is a constraint on the communication of the agent and the agent can be a source of information.
2. Potential for Communication: If there exists an agent acting as a source of information and an agent act-
ing as an information sink, such that the source and sink agents are diﬀerent, and if there exists a pattern
of communication allowing for information to transfer from the source to the sink through the synchroni-
sation and sequencing of events, then the source and sink agents have a potential for communication.
The order of the above conditions is important from a computational perspective. We ﬁrst need to
verify the Constraint on Communication condition in order to determine whether there is a constraint on
communication. If no such constraint exists, then there is no need to verify the Potential for Communication
condition since we will be allowing all agents to communicate freely. Furthermore, the Constraint on
Communication condition allows us to develop a list of agents that have conﬁdential information in their
respective data stores, thereby allowing them to be the source agents in the Potential for Communication
condition. By having this information, we do not need to look for patterns of communication from agents
which cannot be source agents, which will reduce the total number of possible patterns of communication.
To the best of our knowledge, a condition similar to the Constraint on Communication condition is not
found in the literature. This condition considers the knowledge of the agents in the system and allows us to
capture what information can be communicated by the agents in the system. In this way, we only consider
covert channels to be communication channels that pose a threat to the system by aﬀording an ability to
violate the security policy employed by the system. For example, if an agent does not know any conﬁdential
information, then there is no possibility for that agent to communicate any conﬁdential information and
thereby violate the security policy. In other words, we do not need to close oﬀ communication channels
between agents that do not have the potential to violate the system security policy. Additionally, with this
condition, we take care of security policies which explicitly forbid the communication between agents in the
system by using a less restrictive form of such a security policy. For example, if Agent A is forbidden from
communicating with Agent B, then we simply need to consider all information that is known to Agent A
as conﬁdential. Then, we can see that the Constraint on Communication condition is satisﬁed and any
communication channel that may be established from Agent A to Agent B is considered to be a covert
channel.
The Potential for Communication condition is similar to conditions found in the literature. In articulat-
ing the condition, we are rephrasing the existing conditions found in the literature. An information ﬂow may
be established through the synchronisation of events in the system. The synchronisation of events may be
initiated using timed events, where clocks are synchronised, or using a handshake in communication. These
notions exist in many process algebras. Such a synchronisation of events can allow for the creation of a se-
quence of events. This is what is meant by a “pattern of communication.” We are looking to ﬁnd a sequence
of events which allows information to transfer from the source agent to the sink agent, so that the source
agent is the sender and the sink agent is the receiver. The possible source agents can be determined using
the Constraint on Communication condition since only the agents which know conﬁdential information can
be the source of an information leak. Essentially, as long as there is a potential for information to ﬂow from
one agent to another, we ﬁnd that a communication channel can be established.
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There are two important aspects of the proposed set of necessary conditions. The ﬁrst is that it is indeed
a set of necessary conditions meaning that if there exists a covert channel in a system of communicating
agents, then the conditions are satisﬁed. The second is that the proposed set of conditions is veriﬁable.
As discussed in Section 2, not all conditions that are found in the literature are easily veriﬁable. In the
next section, we look at a short example demonstrating the applicability of the proposed set of necessary
conditions for verifying the existence of a covert channel in a system of communicating agents.
5. An Illustrative Example
Although a formal veriﬁcation technique is not complete at this time, we can informally see the feasibil-
ity of the veriﬁcation of the proposed set of necessary conditions for covert channel existence in systems of
communicating agents using a short illustrative example where we introduce a covert channel into a system
of communicating agents. The example is a variation of the FTP command mapping channel from [18].
Suppose that there are four agents in the system: sender S , two proxy agents P1 and P2, and a receiver R.
Let the command space of the FTP protocol be denoted by FTP, i.e., FTP is the set of all FTP commands.
The agents have the following behaviours:
• S : send(c); for c ∈ FTP
• P1 : receive(c); n := ϕ(c); send(n); where ϕ : FTP→ Z is a total and injective function
• P2 : receive(n); if even(n) then mem := 0 else mem := 1;
• R : read(mem)
Consider the following scenario: S issues FTP commands which are received by P1. P1 maps the FTP
commands that it receives to an integer n according to the function ϕ : FTP → Z and it sends n to P2. P2
receives n and stores 0 in a memory location mem if n is even, otherwise it stores 1 in mem. Lastly, R can
read memory location mem and obtain a bit of information. Assume that there is conﬁdential information
in the data store of S . In this way, over a number of iterations of the given protocol, it is possible for
the sender S to leak its conﬁdential information to the receiver R. The sender simply needs to know the
deterministic behaviour of P1 and P2. In particular, S needs to know the function ϕ used by P1 and that P2
will store 0 for n even and 1 for n odd. The sender does not need to know the memory location mem, but
simply that P2 will store the information in a memory location that R can read from. The receiver only
needs to know the memory location mem so that it can read the information and reconstruct the conﬁdential
information from S .
Given the above scenario, we informally verify the proposed necessary conditions for covert channel
existence. First, by assumption we have that there is conﬁdential information in the data store of agent S ,
so there is a Constraint on Communication. Second, since the only conﬁdential information is in the data
store of agent S , S is the only possible source agent. It is easy to see that R is the sink agent, as it does
not actively write or send any information. So, we have source S and sink R where S and R are diﬀerent.
Next, we ﬁnd that there exists a pattern of communication from the source agent to the sink agent allowing
for information transfer. By assuming that agent S performs its actions, followed by P1, then by P2, and
ﬁnally R, we develop a sequence of events which can synchronise on send and receive actions, e.g., send(c)
and receive(c) can handshake to synchronise the transfer of the command c from S to P1. In this way,
we ﬁnd that there is a Potential for Communication from agent S to agent R. Thus, we have satisﬁed the
necessary conditions for covert channel existence.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we discussed existing conditions for covert channel existence as found in the literature and
discussed the need for a new set of necessary conditions for covert channel existence. In the discussion,
we pointed to the inadequacy of the existing conditions for covert channel existence. We also examined
how conditions for covert channel existence are handled by information theory. Our main contribution
involves the development of a new set of necessary conditions for covert channel existence in systems
of communicating agents. In the proposed set of necessary conditions for covert channel existence, we
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introduced a condition which considers the knowledge of the agents in the system as a means of deﬁning the
constraint on the communication of agents in the system. To the best of our knowledge, a condition similar
to this is non-existent in the literature.
The proposed set of necessary conditions are veriﬁable as demonstrated through the discussion in Sec-
tion 4 and the illustrative example in Section 5. In particular, if there exists a covert channel in a system of
communicating agents, then the proposed set of conditions are satisﬁed. The development of such a set of
necessary conditions for covert channel existence attempts to provide a better understanding of covert chan-
nel communication. Additionally, it serves as a foundation for developing eﬀective and eﬃcient mechanisms
for mitigating covert channels in systems of communicating agents.
In future work, we intend to develop a mathematical model which captures the proposed set of necessary
conditions for covert channel existence in systems of communicating agents. From the proposed conditions,
we can see that we need to model both the behaviour and the knowledge of each agent in the system. We
intend to investigate the use of Concurrent Kleene Algebra [19] to represent the behaviour of each agent
in the system and epistemic logic and Kripke structures [20] to represent the knowledge of each agent in
the system. Once we have modelled the system of communicating agents, we will be able to deal with the
formal veriﬁcation of the proposed necessary conditions for covert channel existence.
References
[1] B. Lampson, A note on the conﬁnement problem, Communications of the ACM 16 (10) (1973) 613–615.
[2] U.S.A. Department of Defense, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), no. DoD 5200.28-STD in Defense
Department Rainbow Series (Orange Book), Department of Defense /National Computer Security Center, Fort George G. Meade,
MD, USA, 1985.
[3] S. Zander, G. Armitage, P. Branch, A survey of covert channels and countermeasures in computer network protocols, IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials 9 (3) (2007) 44–57.
[4] H. Tipton, M. Krause, Information Security Management Handbook, Vol. 2, Auerbach, 2008.
[5] C. Probst, J. Hunker, D. Gollmann, M. Bishop, Insider Threats In Cyber Security, Vol. 49 of Advances In Information Security,
Springer, 2010.
[6] U.S.A. National Computer Security Center, A Guide to Understanding Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted Systems, no. NCSC-
TG-030 in NSA/NCSC Rainbow Series (Light Pink Book), National Security Agency / National Computer Security Center, Fort
George G. Meade, MD, USA, 1993.
[7] J. Jaskolka, R. Khedri, Exploring covert channels, in: Proceedings of the 44th Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences, HICSS-44, Koloa, Kauai, HI, USA, 2011, pp. 1–10.
[8] R. Kemmerer, Shared resource matrix methodology: An approach to identifying storage and timing channels, ACM Transactions
on Computer Systems 1 (3) (1983) 256–277.
[9] S. Shieh, A. Chen, Estimating and measuring covert channel bandwidth in multilevel secure operating systems, Journal of Infor-
mation Science and Engineering 15 (1) (1999) 91–106.
[10] C.-D. Wang, S. Ju, D. Guo, Z. Yang, W.-Y. Zheng, Research on the methods of search and elimination in covert channels, in:
M. Li, X.-H. Sun, Q.-N. Deng, J. Ni (Eds.), Grid and Cooperative Computing, Vol. 3032 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 988–991.
[11] Z. Wang, R. Lee, New constructive approach to covert channel modeling and channel capacity estimation, in: J. Zhou, J. Lopez,
R. Deng, F. Bao (Eds.), Proceedings of 8th International Conference on Information Security, Vol. 3650 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, Berlin, Germany, 2005, pp. 498–505.
[12] J. McHugh, Handbook for the Computer Security Certiﬁcation of Trusted Systems, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC,
USA, 1995, Ch. 8: Covert Channel Analysis.
[13] J. Wray, An analysis of covert timing channels, in: Proceedings of the 1991 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in
Security and Privacy, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 1991, pp. 2 – 7.
[14] C.-R. Tsai, V. Gligor, C. Chandersekaran, A formal method for the identiﬁcation of covert storage channels in source code, IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (1987) 74.
[15] K. Siddiqi, Covert channels over TCP/IP and protocol steganography, Tech. Rep. 2003-03-0044, Lahore University of Manage-
ment Sciences (2003).
[16] C. Shannon, A mathematical theory of communication, Bell System Technical Journal 27 (1948) 379–423, 623–656.
[17] I. Moskowitz, M. Kang, Covert channels - here to stay?, in: Computer Assurance, COMPASS ’94 Safety, Reliability, Fault
Tolerance, Concurrency and Real Time, Security, Gaithersburg, MD , USA, 1994, pp. 235–243.
[18] X. Zou, Q. Li, S. Sun, X. Niu, The research on information hiding based on command sequence of FTP protocol, in: R. Khosla,
R. Howlett, L. Jain (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and
Engineering Systems, Vol. 3683 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 1079–1085.
[19] C. Hoare, B. Mo¨ller, G. Struth, I. Wehrman, Concurrent kleene algebra, in: M. Bravetti, G. Zavattaro (Eds.), CONCUR 2009 -
Concurrency Theory, Vol. 5710 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 399–414.
[20] J.-J. C. Meyer, W. van der Hoek, Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science, Vol. 41 of Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical
Computer Science, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
